In the organisational learning literature a variety of concepts exist denoting some third order of organisational learning, notably that of `triple-loop' learning. Despite this there has been no systematic, critical consideration of this concept or its origins, impeding both theoretical development and empirical research. Whilst `triple-loop learning' has been inspired by Argyris and Schön, we establish that the term does not arise in their published work. Indeed, we argue that conceptualisations of triple-loop learning are diverse, often have little theoretical rooting, are sometimes driven by normative considerations, and lack support from empirical research. We map the major influences on these conceptualisations, focussing on Argyris and Schön's work and Bateson's framework of levels of learning. Bateson's third level of learning, which has inspired several authors, reveals a dark side that contrasts with constructions of triple-loop learning as a form of instrumental, strategic thinking.
Introduction
Over the last decade, interest in organisational learning has burgeoned, with both increasing journal and book output (Bapuji and Crossan 2004 , Dehler and Vendelø 2010 , Elliott et al. 2008 , Scarbrough et al. 2007 ) and an increasing number of reviews of the field (e.g. Easterby-Smith et al. 1999, Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2003, single-and double-loop learning. Furthermore, not one of the sources already cited that offers any conceptualisation of triple-loop learning explores similarities or tensions between competing definitions. This lack of either consensus or critical discussion impedes theoretical development and makes testing and measurement through empirical research difficult. It also leads to confusion for practitioners about the role that learning can play in responding to wider pressures and challenges in the organisational environment.
The aim of this paper is therefore to undertake a critical review of the ways in which triple loop learning has been conceptualised by organisation and management scholars. By conceptualisation we mean the identification of conceptual components and the formation of conceptual definitions. As such conceptualisation precedes operationalisation, the former being at the level of theory and the latter at the level of research (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). Within this we explore the original work of Argyris and Schön, and of the anthropologist and cybernetician Gregory Bateson, the major influences cited by authors who propose these conceptualisations.
This enables us to make a theoretical contribution through identifying three distinct conceptualisations of `triple-loop learning'. These are: a) a level beyond, and considered by proponents to be superior to, Argyris and Schön's `single-loop' and `double-loop' learning; b) an equivalent to Schön's (1978, 1996) concept of `deuterolearning'; c) a proposed third level inspired by Bateson's (1973) i framework of levels of learning (specifically `Learning III').
We discuss why these conceptualisations should be regarded as distinct from each other, and highlight some implications for practice.
Conceptualisations of `triple-loop learning'
As noted, scholars of organisational learning might look first to Argyris and Schön for a definition of triple-loop learning. Indeed, several authors (e.g. Gilmore and Warren 2007 , Jakimow 2008 , and Mark 2006 attribute triple-loop learning to, or associate it with, their work. Dishman and Pearson (2003: 616) say ` Argyris (1991) proposed that there is also triple-loop learning, which provides feedback and a change mechanism for the individual.' Yet an examination of their work shows that Argyris and Schön neither formulate nor mention any notion of `triple-loop learning'. More precisely, no instance of the term appears in the text or index of any of Argyris and Schön's joint or separate publications, including seminal texts such as Argyris and Schön (1974 , 1978 , 1996 , Argyris (1991 Argyris ( , 1999 Argyris ( , 2004 , and Schön (1983 Schön ( , 1987 ; nor, based on our examination of this literature, do we consider that Argyris and Schön developed any conceptualisation that was intended by them as, or equates to, a third `loop' of learning that would logically extend their notions of single-and double-loop learning `when the essential principles on which the organization is founded come into discussion' and involving `the development of new principles, with which an organization can proceed to a subsequent phase'. Similarly, Isaacs (1993: 30) , discussing dialogue as a reflective process, acknowledges Argyris and Schön (1978, among others) and also Hawkins (1991) . He suggests that triple-loop learning `opens inquiry into underlying "why's."…that permits insight into the nature of paradigm itself.' In a similar vein, though in an apparently separate strand of development, Nielsen (1993: 118) , writing about Woolman's action learning method applied to issues of ethics, proposes that triple-loop action-learning involves `change in the embedded tradition system within which the governing values of a behaviour can be nested'. Nielsen suggests (1993: 118) , that this may represent `a theoretical advance beyond' Argyris and Schön.
This first conceptualisation of triple-loop learning is therefore generated by authors who view it as a level that is beyond and superior to Argyris and Schön's `singleloop' and `double-loop' learning, and that is concerned with the underlying purposes, principles or paradigms. Following Argyris and Schön's schema logically, since double-loop learning involves correction of governing variables, it would appear that triple-loop learning should be concerned with change in whatever governs those governing variables. This could be the `paradigm' to which Issacs (1993: 30) refers, or the `embedded tradition system' discussed by Nielsen (1993: 118) . However, these terms remain ill-defined and imprecise. Roper and Pettit (2002) observe that the discussion of triple-loop learning is often normative, simply encouraging organisations to aspire beyond single-and doubleloop learning. This indicates a sense in which this first conceptualisation could exemplify the dominant managerial perspective on organisational learning that is noted by Huysman (2000) . It is noteworthy that several of the sources cited above emphasise applied learning. Hawkins' (1991) article appears in the journal that was the precursor to Management Learning, which at that time targeted both academic and practitioner audiences. Swieringa and Wierdsma's (1992) book appears in the practitioner-focused Addison-Wesley series on Organisation Development. Isaacs writes in the journal Organizational Dynamics whose objective is `to link leadingedge thought and research with management practice'. Rhetoric concerned with a `higher' (or `deeper') subject matter that (for example) `informs the strategic thinking' (Hawkins 1991: 183) , or which concerns the `essential principles on which the organization is founded' (Swieringa and Wierdsma 1992: 41 -2) appears to constitute the kind of normative appeal to the value of, or even the necessity for, higher-order learning, observed by Roper and Pettit (2002) .
This conceptualisation has also been portrayed in a more instrumental and reductive fashion, such as a solution offered by consultants, or as a strategic choice available to managers. For example, Lassey (1998: 11) describes triple-loop learning as where `the role or the mission of the organization is questioned', and suggests an example of managers deciding intentionally to change the nature of their business from a fast food outlet to a café. This is problematic because changing the nature of a business does not necessarily constitute even double-loop learning; it therefore mistakes a change in external circumstances for change in values or principles.
Conceptualisation B: Deutero-learning
An alternative conceptualisation was subsequently offered by Flood and Romm (1996) , Romme and van Witteloostuijn (1999) , Snell and Chak (1998) and Yuthas et al. (2004) . This differs from the first in that it emphasises reflexivity towards, and (Flood and Romm 1996: 163) that their own conceptualisation (defined as `increasing the fullness and deepness of learning about the diversity of issues and dilemmas faced, by linking together all local units of learning in one overall learning infrastructure as well as developing the competences and skills to use this infrastructure') is distinctive; nevertheless, this also emphasises learning about the process of learning.
Whilst citing both Argyris and Schön (1974) and Hawkins (1991) Yuthas et al. (2004) , who advocate `triple-loop learning' in relation to ethics in public accounting, acknowledge Argyris (1982) and Schön (1974, 1978) , but not Snell and Chak. They define triple-loop learning (2004: 239) as `continual reflection on the learning process, the contexts within which learning occurs, and the assumptions and values motivating the learning and influencing its outcomes'.
Is deutero-learning therefore simply Argyris and Schön's terminology for their own conceptualisation of a third order of learning? This appears not to be the case.
Although the relationship between double-loop learning and deutero-learning is not always clear in the work of Argyris and Schön, it seems that these concepts often refer to the same second-order learning phenomenon (Visser 2007 ). More recent comments by Argyris (2003 Argyris ( : 1179 appear definitive on this point:
`We understood deutero-learning to mean second-order learning, reflecting on the first-order actions. Deutero-learning can occur by going meta on single or double-loop learning. The distinction is important because the knowledge and skills required to produce double-loop learning are significantly greater and more complicated than those required for deutero-learning on single-loop is-
In other words, Argyris casts deutero-learning not as a further level in a hierarchy going beyond single-and double-, but as `meta' to either single or double-loop learning. Saliently, Argyris' comment about the knowledge and skills required for doubleloop learning being `significantly greater and more complicated' than those required for deutero-learning on single-loop issues, supports our view that Argyris does not regard deutero-learning as a higher order of learning than double-loop learning.
Understandably, the noted confusion about the nature of deutero-learning appears in other authors' work. For example, Thomsen and Hoest (2001: 474) regard deuterolearning as an extension beyond double-loop learning that resembles the first conceptualisation of triple-loop learning, in that `members question and challenge the assumptions about the existence of the organization'.
In conclusion, our conceptualisation B refers to those authors who have equated Argyris and Schön's notion of deutero-learning with `triple-loop learning'. We emphasise that Argyris and Schön themselves did not regard deutero-learning as a third `loop' beyond double-loop learning.
Conceptualisation C: Bateson's Learning III
It is evident from Table 1 that, in addition to Argyris and Schön, Bateson is a prominent influence on several authors. We turn now to his framework of `levels of learning' in order to explain the context in which a third distinct conceptualisation of `third-order' learning (i.e. Learning III) appears. Isaacs (1993: 30) suggests that
Learning III `could also be called "triple-loop learning."' Nevertheless, in this section we argue that Bateson's notion of `Learning III' differs radically from the first two conceptualisations of triple-loop learning in several respects that are significant for our understanding of organisational learning.
Bateson worked across diverse fields including anthropology, cybernetics and family therapy (Hawkins 2004; Visser 2003 Visser , 2007 . While Thomas et al. (2007: 872) report that the majority of Bateson's citations in the SSCI (Social Science Citation Index) are in the field of business and organisation management, Bateson's central preoccupation was with epistemology, the `processes of knowing, thinking and deciding' (Bateson 1979: 242) . Working in the field of anthropology in the 1940s, Bateson had observed (1973: 139-40 ) that in psychological experiments: `…there is a common phenomenon of a somewhat higher degree of abstraction or generality than those which the experiments are planning to elucidate. It is a commonplace that the experimental subject -whether animal or man, becomes a better subject after repeated experiment. He not only learns to salivate at the appropriate moments, or to recite the appropriate nonsense syllables; he also, in some way, learns to learn.'
Based on this observation, Bateson proposed a distinction between `proto-learning'
and `deutero-learning'. It is relevant to note that like Argyris and Schön, Bateson was influenced by cybernetician Ross Ashby. Argyris and Schön (1974: 18-19; 1978: 3, 337; 1996: 21) Schön 1974: 19, 1978: 18-19 ) and deutero-learning Schön 1978: 26, 1996 Table 2 ii . While Bateson did not apply this framework to issues of organisational learning himself, it is referenced widely in articles on organisational learning and related topics (e.g. Bartunek and Moch 1994 , French and Bazalgette 1996 , Huysman 2000 , Nielsen 1993 , Roach and Bednar 1997 , Schein 1999 , Tosey and Mathison 2008 , Visser 2003 , Wijnhoven 2001 , and Yuthas et al. 2004 ).
Bateson described his framework as an attempt to illuminate `the barriers of misunderstanding which divide the various species of behavioural scientists… by an application of Russell's Theory of Logical Types to the concept of "learning" ' (1973: 250) . In Bateson's framework, therefore, each higher level of learning represents the class of instances of learning of the lower type. Thus Bredo (1989: 36) notes that `instrumental conditioning tasks, for example, teach not only how to discriminate between particular stimuli, but also about instrumentality itself'.
This indicates the essence of the difference that we argue exists between conceptualisation B and conceptualisation C. Conceptualisation B entails reflexivity; in other words, it concerns learning as applied to the process of learning itself.
Conceptualisation C, on the other hand, is a new logical category, one to which all instances of learning at the previous level belong.
It is pertinent to comment on the way Bateson conceived Learning 0, I and II in order to clarify his conceptualisation of Learning III. Learning 0 entails responding to stimuli but making no changes based on experience or information. While at first glance one might dismiss the value of Learning 0, it recognises both the importance and the utility of not changing; for example it may be said to include skilled, unconscious performance, and habituation.
The emphasis of Learning I is change within a set of alternatives. Learning I is therefore broadly comparable to Argyris and Schön's (1996: 68) `single loop learning', which occurs `whenever an error is detected and corrected without questioning or altering the underlying values of the system...' In an organisation this could occur through seeking more efficient ways to manufacture an existing product or deliver an existing service.
In Learning II, one not only learns but simultaneously learns how to learn. Learning II introduces the notion of context, which concerns the meaning given to behaviour;
there is change in the way events are punctuated, and `…a way of punctuating is not true or false' (Bateson 1973: 271) . Context is significant because it emphasises the need to understand learning as both recursive and relational; Bateson's ideas entail a shift from a linear to circular notion of causality (as is foundational in cybernetics),
and from an individual to a social perspective on learning. Snyder's (1971) Regarding the first issue, Bateson questioned the idea that Learning III can be achieved through conscious, instrumental means. Bateson was known to hold a deeply passive attitude towards human interference in nature, being sceptical about the capacity for deliberate social planning and intervention to leave `the complexity and spirit of the biological world' unimpaired (Lipset 1980: 287 Regarding the third issue, Bateson's levels of learning are arranged hierarchically, but he was aware that this was an over-simplification (Bateson 1973) . Within Bateson's five levels, `higher' orders of learning are not inherently superior to or more desirable than `lower' levels; this challenges conceptualisations of triple-loop learning that conceive of lower levels of learning as being of lesser value than higher levels (e.g.
Snell and Chak 1998). Bredo (1989: 32) affirms that this `multilevel approach to change is not a stage theory moving sequentially from lower to higher levels of learning'. Roach and Bednar (1997: 674) emphasise that Bateson `refers to the levels as orders of recursion', and Flood and Romm (1996) allude, if briefly, to a recursive relationship between levels of learning. Rather, the levels go in parallel and represent different orders of abstraction. To illustrate this distinction, Figure 1 is a schematic depiction of a recursive hierarchy. In a linear hierarchy, each successive level appears above the other (as in Table 2) , and a higher level is assumed to be superior to a lower level, as in hierarchy of job roles shown on a typical organisation chart. In Figure 1, we have arranged the levels of learning as concentric circles to represent the idea that each successive level extends beyond the boundary of, and includes, the previous level. Learning at `higher' levels means that new premises with successively wider scope are involved. Figure 1 also introduces feedback loops from each level to all of the prior levels, and vice versa. These loops represent the central principle of recursion, which is that causality flows from cause to effect and back again, such that `a given phenomenon, viewed in context, is both the cause and effect of related phenomena and, ultimately, its own cause' (Roach and Bednar 1997: 674) . The diagram looks complex, which is precisely our point; recursion involves greater complexity than, and is more dynamic than, a linear hierarchy.
Regarding the final issue, Bateson's framework also challenges the assumption that `higher' orders of learning are necessarily more desirable than `lower' orders -an assumption that is common in the Western world, where `more' is usually held to be `better'. Specifically, a central feature of Bateson's conceptualisation is that higher order learning entails risk, and calls into question the wisdom of the apparent hunger for transformational learning in organisations. Thus Bateson (1973: 277) considered that `even the attempt at LIII can be dangerous', with psychotic breakdown as a possible consequence for an individual since the very concept of `self' may be abandoned. Perhaps not surprisingly, Bateson refers to the notion of fools rushing in where angels fear to tread (Bateson and Bateson 1988) . Attempts by managers to control and directly effect Learning III may, in an analogous way, result in unintended consequences (Roach and Bednar 1997, Tosey 2005 ) and profound `organizational unlearning' (Tsang and Zahra 2008) . Significantly, calls for transformation led by an enthusiasm for the value of 'higher' levels of learning may underestimate the impact on an organisation's ecology.
An implication of this feature is that the pursuit of higher orders of learning has ideological and not merely technological dimensions. Authors such as Contu et al. (2003) and Huysman (2000) are among the few to identify a value-laden rhetoric in the field of management, such that 'learning' and `the learning organisation' are seen as unequivocally good things; even (as noted by French and Bazalgette 1996) as some kind of holy grail. This would appear to be a projection of the type of instrumental, goal-orientated mind-set that Bateson criticised as epistemologically flawed, and in his view likely to lead to disaster.
Bateson therefore offers a darker view that emphasises risk in the pursuit of transformation. Fundamentally, Bateson's conceptualisation is about wisdom rather than rational knowledge. It involves a change of epistemology -that is, a change in the form of knowing and learning -not merely a change in subject matter (as from operations to strategy in conceptualisation A) or a reflexivity about the process of learning, as in conceptualisation B. We suggest that the four features discussed here provide the basis for a critique of conceptualisations of triple-loop learning.
The need for further work to apply Bateson's framework to organisational learning is emphasised by Engeström (2001: 139) , who suggests that his conceptualisation of Learning III was `a provocative proposal, not an elaborated theory', and Bredo (1989: 36) , for whom the levels of learning are `properly viewed as a framework and not an elaborated theory'. That it appears to be misconstrued at times is not helped by
Bateson's writing being primarily theoretical and lacking detailed empirical evidence.
Bateson's research style was unconventional to the extent that theory took precedence over empirical observations. Instead of inductive generalisation, Bateson favoured abduction, where he used empirical data to illustrate the operationalisation of his concepts, not to provide empirical proof. He often collected small amounts of data that were discarded when the thinking they were intended to support was done (Lipset 1980; Visser 2003) .
Synthesis and discussion
In order to summarise our ideas, Table 3 -
The three areas of Table 3 marked A, B and C denote the three principal conceptualisations that we have identified. We emphasise that the literature cited can combine or blur these conceptualisations. Hawkins (1991) , for example, offers a blend of conceptualisations A and C. Schippers et al. (2007) appear to blend conceptualisations A and B when proposing three levels of reflection in teams (following Swift and West 1998). They liken `deep reflection' to triple-loop learning (attributed to Nielsen 1993 and Snell and Chak 1998) in which `the norms and values of the team or organisation are questioned and their effect on team and organisational functioning is discussed' (Schippers et al. 2007: 191) . We have not mapped individual authors discussed in this paper onto Table 3 , which would give the impression of an over-simplified arena. However, the principal influences on those authors are apparent from Table 1 and our foregoing discussion.
It is noteworthy that not one of the sources cited above that proposes any conceptualisation of triple-loop learning explores similarities or tensions between competing definitions; this paper is the first to attempt such a review. The need for such examination is shown, among other things, by the authors cited referring variously to the focus of learning (`…the essential principles on which the organization is founded', Swieringa and Wierdsma 1992: 41-2); the process of learning (`new processes for generating mental maps', Snell and Chak 1998: 339) ; the relational scope of learning (`collective mindfulness', Snell and Chak 1998: 340) was concerned with no less transformative a task than that of saving the world from the hypothesised effects of climate change. In order to achieve this, it was believed that the summit would need to produce a paradigmatic shift in strategies for dealing with climate change. If we were to take at face value Swieringa and Wierdsma's (1992) suggestion, noted above, that triple-loop learning can take the form of discussion through which progress is achieved, the design would appear sufficient, since it was a collective event through which all interested nations could, in theory, participate in decisions.Yet a familiar format -conferencing among representative delegates -was adopted that was probably better known for producing compromises than breakthroughs. Despite espousal of the need for a transformative outcome, we suggest that the Copenhagen summit was primarily an example of single-loop learning, in Argyris' terms, and Learning I, in Bateson's terms.
Concluding comment
In the organisational learning literature, `triple-loop' learning is the most prominent of the concepts that exist to denote some third order of organisational learning. In this article we have established that whilst triple-loop learning has clearly been inspired by Argyris and Schön, it does not arise explicitly in their published work. This paper has also questioned the preference for higher levels of learning that char- Proposes triple-loop action-learning as a theoretical advance beyond Schön (1974, 1988 (Argyris 1982; Schön 1974, 1978) . Learning III `…is change in the process of Learning II, e.g. a corrective change in the system of sets of alternatives from which choice is made'. Learning II `…is change in the process of Learning I, e.g. a corrective change in the set of alternatives from which choice is made, or it is a change in how the sequence of experience is punctuated'. Learning I `…is change in specificity of response by correction of errors of choice within a set of alternatives'.
Learning 0 `…is characterised by specificity of response, which -right or wrong -is not subject to correction'. 
